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What is interpretation? One can imagine a range of answers to this
question. One answer might begin with the observation that the English word
“interpretation” is used to refer to a variety of human activities. Translators at
the United Nations interpret remarks made in French when they offer an
English translation. Literary critics interpret novels when they investigate the
deep and sometimes unconscious motivations of the author. Conductors
interpret a score when they make decisions about meter, tempo, and dynamic
range. Actors interpret a screenplay when they improvise new lines based on
their understanding of the characters. Judges interpret statutes when they
attempt to disambiguate words and phrases that could have multiple senses.
The term “interpretation” is used in a variety of contexts to refer to a variety of
human activities.
It might be the case that the word “interpretation” is used in different senses
in these diverse contexts – the word “interpretation” may be ambiguous. Or it
could be the case that the diversity of interpretive activities is evidence that
“interpretation” is a “family resemblance”1 concept (to use Wittgenstein’s
felicitous phrase): the various forms of interpretation may share an overlapping
set of characteristics, but lack an “essence” or core. And finally, it is possible
that all of the diverse human activities that we call “interpretation” are unified
– that “interpretation” is a functional kind with an essential structure.
In other words, there are at least three views about the relationship between
all of the various activities that we call “interpretation”; we can express these
three views as three competing theses or claims. The ambiguity thesis is the
claim that the word “interpretation” refers to several conceptually distinct
activities and that it is simply a mistake to advance a theory of interpretation
that seeks to unify them. The family resemblance thesis is the claim that the
diversity of interpretive phenomena is structured by a series of common
features, no one of which is shared by all of the activities that we call
“interpretation.” The unity-of-interpretation thesis is the claim that all (or
almost all) of the activities that we call “interpretation” share a common
structure or set of essential properties. This Essay investigates the unity-ofinterpretation thesis in relation to the views advanced by Ronald Dworkin, in
his new, deeply interesting, and sure-to-be-controversial book, Justice for
Hedgehogs.2
Justice for Hedgehogs represents the latest stage in the development of
Dworkin’s complex and evolving theory of interpretation. Part I of this Essay
argues that as Dworkin’s theory of “interpretation” has developed, the object
of the theory has shifted from the interpretation of legal texts to the
construction of legal rules to general normative theory. Part II explicates the
theory of interpretation offered in Justice for Hedgehogs and the unity-of1

See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 32 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 1968).
2 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (forthcoming 2010) (Apr. 17, 2009
manuscript, on file with the Boston University Law Review).
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interpretation thesis – the claim that all of the various activities that we call
“interpretation” share an essential structure with all human intellectual
activities other than science. This Part concludes that Dworkin’s view
obscures rather than illuminates the nature of “interpretation” in law and legal
theory. Part III suggests a reconstruction of Dworkin’s view that draws on the
distinction between “interpretation” and “construction.”
I.

THREE STAGES IN DWORKIN’S THEORY OF INTERPRETATION

Justice for Hedgehogs offers a new theory of interpretation, but it also
represents the culmination of decades of theorizing by Ronald Dworkin. In
this Part of the Essay, I will investigate the changes in Dworkin’s views by
identifying three stages of development in his thought. Stage one is roughly
associated with his early essay, Hard Cases.3 Stage two was developed in his
book Law’s Empire4 and is the basis for his theory, law as integrity. Stage
three is found in Justice for Hedgehogs. Dworkin may or may not accept this
three-stage sequence as an adequate reconstruction of the positions he intended
to convey,5 but the three stages do represent distinct moments in the
understandings of his readers and interlocutors.
A.

Hard Cases: Fit and Justification

In Hard Cases, Dworkin offered a view of interpretation that seemed to
distinguish between easy cases, where the legal sources did the work, and hard
cases, in which judges were required to move beyond the rules that were
explicit in legal texts (such as constitutional provisions, statutes, and cases) and
resort to principles.6 At this stage, Dworkin explicitly distinguished between
the criteria of “fit” and “justification,” and seemed to suggest a two-step
process. Step one: identify the set of possible legal rules that fits the existing
institutional history (e.g., the texts of the authoritative legal materials).7 If
there is only one rule that fits, or if all the rules that fit favor the same
resolution of the case, then we need not proceed beyond step one. Step two:
select from among those rules on the basis of the principles or values that
provide the best justification for that institutional history.8

3

Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975).
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
5 In oral remarks at the Boston University conference, Dworkin seemed to express
general assent to the account offered in the oral remarks that formed the basis for this Essay.
See Ronald Dworkin, Ronald Dworkin, Response to Panel II: Interpretation at Justice for
Hedgehogs: A Conference on Ronald Dworkin’s Forthcoming Book (Sept. 25-26, 2009)
(transcript on file with the Boston University Law Review) [hereinafter Dworkin,
Response].
6 Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1058-60.
7 Id. at 1059 (discussing “arguments of policy”).
8 Id. (discussing “arguments of principle”).
4
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This reading of Hard Cases may be controversial, but it is supported by the
text. For example, in introducing the idea of a hard case, Dworkin stated, “if
the case at hand is a hard case, when no settled rule dictates a decision either
way, then it might seem that a proper decision could be generated by either
policy or principle.”9 The implication is that easy cases are those in which a
“settled rule” does “dictate a decision” and this seems (on the surface) to be
consistent with H.L.A. Hart’s picture of “core” and “penumbra”10 – although
that theory is never mentioned in Hard Cases. If the core of a legal rule
decided a case, it was in the “core” and an “easy case,” and both Hart and
Dworkin seemed to agree that the positive law dictated the outcome. But
Dworkin’s account of the judging in “hard cases” seems inconsistent with
Hart’s account of judging in the “penumbra.”11 If the case was in the
penumbra, then Hart believed the adjudicator has discretion, but Dworkin
argued that there is always a right answer – and that answer is provided by the
normative theory that best fit and justified the law as a whole.
B.

Law’s Empire: Law as Integrity

In Law’s Empire, Dworkin offered a more fully developed and systematic
theory of the law, which he called “law as integrity”; this theory is an
application of the more general method that he calls “interpretivism.”12 That
theory seemed to differ from the theory offered in Hard Cases in several
respects, but for our purpose, one of these (seeming) differences is particularly
important. Dworkin adopts the position that the method for deciding hard
cases and easy cases is identical,13 and this seems to imply that Dworkin parts
company with Hart on the related notion that there is a sharp distinction
between the core and penumbra of a legal rule.
In this second stage of development, interpretation begins with construction
of the normative theory that best justifies the institutional history, including the
texts of the authoritative legal materials. That theory then supplies the content
of the law.14 Of course, “fit” still plays a role in a certain sense. The
normative theory is a theory that provides the best possible justification for the

9

Id. at 1060.
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
607 (1958).
11 Id.
12 See Stephen R. Perry, Method and Principle in Legal Theory, 111 YALE L.J. 1757,
1807 (2002) (reviewing JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY (2001)).
13 See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 354 (“Hercules does not need one
method for hard cases and another for easy ones.”); see also id. at 266 (“[E]asy cases are,
for law as integrity, only special cases of hard ones . . . .”).
14 My view of this relationship has been greatly influenced by the work of Mark
Greenberg. See Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and Its Discontents (UCLA Sch. of
Law Research Paper No. 08-07, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103569.
10
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institutional history of a particular community, and that history includes
constitutional provisions, statutes, and court decisions. Thus, the normative
theory must “fit” the institutional history. But if it turns out that the best
normative theory requires that a particular case be decided in a way that is
contrary to the core (in Hart’s sense) of an existing legal text, then the
normative theory prevails and the seeming “core” of the legal rule must give
way. We could call this implication of Dworkin’s theory, the “instability-ofthe-core thesis.”
Whereas the theory of interpretation offered in Hard Cases seemed to be a
two-step theory, the theory offered in Law’s Empire looked like a one-step
theory.15 Fit and justification were not two distinct moments in the interpretive
enterprise; rather, justification now does all the normative work and fit merely
identifies that which must be justified.16
This one-step theory of Law’s Empire seemed to have a variety of
advantages over the two-step theory that was presented in Hard Cases, but it
also raised a number of questions. One of those questions focused on the
moral significance of the theory that provided the best justification for the
institutional history of a particular community. Dworkin argued for that theory
on the basis of the value of integrity, but this argument struck many as odd.
Why should the value of integrity trump our all-things-considered moral
judgments in the case of law if that value is insufficient in other contexts? If
there is a moral theory that is superior to the theory that best justifies our
institutional history, then shouldn’t we act on the basis of the superior theory?
After all, our institutional history may involve moral mistakes. Why should
those mistakes exert moral force? At a deeper level, there seemed to be
discontinuity between the kind of morality that ruled Law’s Empire and the
rest of morality. How can there be two distinct approaches to morality, one for
law and a different one for the rest of life?
These questions suggest a familiar objection to Dworkin’s theory, which we
can state in terms of the distinction between easy and hard cases. We might
accept that judges have an obligation to comply with the law, even when the

15

Dworkin does, however, describe the theory of Law’s Empire as involving two steps:
First, there must be a “preinterpretive” stage in which the rules and standards taken to
provide the tentative content of the practice are identified. . . . Second, there must be
an interpretive stage at which the interpreter settles on some general justification for
the main elements of the practice identified at the preinterpretive stage.
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 65-66. But this is not a two-step theory of
interpretation; interpretation is stage two. If the same schema were applied to the theory in
Hard Cases, there would be a three-step theory: (1) identify the object of interpretation; (2)
identify the settled core (the easy issues); and (3) apply the method of fit and justification to
the penumbra (the hard issues).
16 This is explicit in the passage quoted supra note 15.
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result the law requires is not the same as the result that would otherwise17 be
required by the application of the moral theory that we believe is true or
correct; let us call this the “first-best moral theory.” Different comprehensive
moral theories will give different justifications for a judicial obligation of
fidelity to law; for example, consequentialists might argue that judicial
adherence to the law produces better consequences than the alternatives. The
next stage in the objection argues that in hard cases, judges should have direct
recourse to the first-best moral theory: for example, a consequentialist might
argue that in a hard case, the judge should make the decision that will produce
the best consequences. But Dworkin’s theory does not permit judges to do
this. Instead, Dworkin’s ideal judge, Hercules, must decide on the basis of the
moral theory that best justifies the law as a whole, and if the law contains
substantial moral mistakes, as it surely does, then this moral theory will
systematically vary from the first-best moral theory. Thus, we might call the
moral theory that Hercules constructs the “second-best moral theory.” The
objection then concludes that law-as-integrity requires judges to adhere to the
second-best moral theory in hard cases, when it is plain that in such cases, our
best theory of morality would require that the judge act directly on the basis of
the first-best moral theory itself.
Of course, Dworkin has an obvious answer to these questions. He can argue
that the first-best moral theory does indeed require that judges decide on the
basis of the theory that best fits and justifies the law as a whole. Indeed, there
are passages in Law’s Empire that seem to aim at this conclusion.18 But there
is a problem with the execution of this strategy; in Law’s Empire, Dworkin
does not offer a comprehensive theory of morality. This means that Dworkin’s
critics are free to argue that Dworkin is mistaken about the moral attractiveness
of law as integrity, because there are good and sufficient reasons to affirm a
comprehensive moral theory that implies that law as integrity is not correct.
For example, a consequentialist could argue that consequentialism is the
correct comprehensive moral theory for a variety of reasons (using the method
of reflective equilibrium, using arguments from metaethics, and so forth). The
consequentialist could then argue that consequentialism does not support law
as integrity, and hence, that the theory in Law’s Empire should be rejected on
moral grounds. Dworkin cannot answer this argument with evidence that the
consequentialist view is inconsistent with the phenomenology of judging or the
implicit commitments of legal practice. The consequentialist could concede
that point, but argue that these perceptions and practices are moral mistakes.19

17 By otherwise, I mean “in the absence of controlling legal rules” or “if the case were a
hard case rather than an easy case” or “if the case were in the penumbra rather than the core
of the relevant legal rule.”
18 See, e.g., DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 186-90.
19 These remarks and questions about Dworkin’s view in Law’s Empire are not intended
as objections; this assessment of the viability of the normative legal theory offered in Law’s
Empire is far outside the scope of this Essay. Rather, I aim to present a picture of the way in
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How could Dworkin answer the objection to law as integrity from the
argument that it is inconsistent with the first-best moral theory? I will discuss
four possibilities. The first three possibilities are unattractive for reasons that I
will discuss in the next three paragraphs. This leaves us with the fourth
possibility, which will set the stage for our discussion of the view of
interpretation that has emerged in Justice of Hedgehogs.
First, Dworkin might argue that all of the plausible moral theories support
law as integrity. This strategy would be a variant of the strategy that Rawls
employed in Political Liberalism, which relied on the idea of an overlapping
consensus.20 But executing this could well be a Herculean task: it seems
unlikely that Dworkin, who “takes rights seriously,” will be able to show that
his theory is fully consistent with all forms of consequentialism (e.g., act
utilitarianism) or with aretaic theories of morality (e.g., NeoAristotelian virtue
ethics).
A second option would be for Dworkin to argue that one of the existing
moral theories that is external to law as integrity is the first-best theory and
then to show that this theory (perhaps a form of deontology) supports law as
integrity. This strategy might work, but it would require Dworkin to do
considerable work, as it is not clear that any of the comprehensive moral
theories that are plausible candidates for the title of “first-best” will easily
accommodate law as integrity.
Third, Dworkin might pursue an “independence” strategy, arguing that that
realm of legal normativity is independent of general views about moral and
political philosophy. This strategy is a nonstarter for Dworkin, because law as
integrity is explicitly committed to the continuity of legal normativity with
moral and political philosophy.
There is, however, a fourth strategy available to Dworkin. Dworkin could
argue that his theory of legal normativity, law as integrity, is actually a special
case of the best comprehensive moral theory. Using somewhat different
terminology that Dworkin employs himself, we might call this fourth strategy
“morality as integrity.” For this strategy to succeed, Dworkin would be
required to argue that interpretivism, the metatheory that provided the
metajurisprudential foundations of law as integrity, is also the appropriate
metatheory (or metaethics) for normative theory in general. In other words,
Dworkin would be required to argue that all normative inquiry is interpretive
in nature, and hence that the concept or activity of interpretation has a very
wide scope.
C.

Justice for Hedgehogs: The Unity of Interpretation

This brings us to the third stage in the development of Dworkin’s theory of
interpretation. In Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin argues that both law and
which Law’s Empire was received in order to provide the context for the emergence of
Dworkin’s new view in Justice for Hedgehogs.
20 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (expanded ed. 2005).
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morality are interpretive. That is, Dworkin argues that interpretation is a
general normative practice, and that law and morality, as well as a variety of
other human activities, are best understood as instances of interpretation.
Indeed, it turns out that the normative standards that govern every human
activity except science are interpretive.
A full sketch of Dworkin’s theory will be provided in the next Part of this
Essay. At this point, however, we are in a position to take stock of the
development of Dworkin’s theory of interpretation.
In Hard Cases,
interpretivism plays a role limited to the zone that Hart might have called the
penumbra of legal rules. In Law’s Empire, interpretivism governs all of law.
And in Hedgehogs, interpretivism provides the normative theory for all human
endeavors except science. If this pattern continues, we might expect that
Dworkin’s next book will take up the philosophy of science, extending
interpretivism to this final domain.
II.

WHAT IS INTERPRETATION?

At this point, my investigation of Dworkin’s theory of interpretation pivots.
I turn from narrative to a critical examination of the content of the theory
offered in Justice as Hedgehogs. Let me state my conclusion up front.
Dworkin argues that interpretation is a very general human practice, and that
legal interpretation, musical interpretation, moral reflection, and every human
intellectual activity (aside from science) are instances of interpretation. That
argument is in error; Dworkin has confounded activities that are of
fundamentally different types. In other words, the unity-of-interpretation
thesis is false.
A.

The Structure of Dworkin’s Theory

Dworkin begins Chapter Seven of Justice for Hedgehogs:
You are interpreting me as you read this text. Historians interpret
events and epochs, psychoanalysts dreams, sociologists and
anthropologists societies and cultures, lawyers documents, critics poems,
plays and pictures, priests and rabbis sacred texts. . . .
. . . [A]ll these genres and types of interpretation share important
features that make it appropriate to treat interpretation as one of two great
domain[s] of intellectual activity, standing as a full partner beside science
in an embracing dualism of understanding.21
In these passages, Dworkin explicitly affirms what I have called “the unity-ofinterpretation thesis.” Dworkin realizes that this thesis may be controversial.
After acknowledging the possibility that these disparate activities are unified
only by family resemblance, and that “the different genres have little in

21

DWORKIN, supra note 2 (manuscript at 79).
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common,”22 Dworkin then states that there is “one important contrary
indication”23:
We find it natural to report our conclusions, in each and every genre of
interpretation, in the language of intention or purpose. We speak of the
meaning or significance of a passage in a poem or a play, of the point of a
clause in a particular statute, of the motives that produced a particular
dream, of the ambitions or understandings that shaped an event or an
age.24
But this common feature does not lead Dworkin to embrace the view that
interpretation is a matter of recovering “psychological states.” Although there
is one important case, “conversational interpretation,” in which we do aim at
the recovery of the speakers’ intentions, in other genres, for example historical
interpretation, psychological states are not the proper target.25 Each genre or
type of social practice has its own purpose; we interpret within a genre by
attributing to the tokens of the genre their “proper purpose,” that is “the value
that it does and ought to provide.”26
This leads Dworkin to a three-step theory of interpretation:
We interpret social practices, first, when we individuate those practices:
when we take ourselves to be engaged in legal rather than literary
interpretation, for example. We interpret, second, when we attribute
some package of purposes to the genre or sub-genre we identify as
pertinent and, third, when we try to identify the best realization of that
package of purposes on some particular occasion.27
But it is important to emphasize that Dworkin is using the term “purpose” in a
special sense here, because he does not mean the kind of purpose that is
necessarily a psychological state.
Dworkin’s sense of the term “purpose” is illustrated by his discussion of
statutory interpretation:
We can state the purpose of statutory interpretation very briefly in the
abstract: the practice aims to make the governance of the pertinent
community fairer, wiser, and more just. That description fits what
lawyers and judges do when they interpret statutes; it justifies that
practice, in a general way, and it suggests, also in a very general way,
what standards are appropriate for deciding which interpretation of a
particular statute is most successful.28

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Id.
Id.
Id. (manuscript at 79-80).
Id. (manuscript at 83).
Id. (manuscript at 84).
Id.
Id. (manuscript at 85).

560

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:551

“Purpose” in Dworkin’s sense is the goal, aim, or telos of the object of
interpretation. The kind of goal that can be a Dworkinian “purpose” is a goal
that provides a normative justification for the practice being interpreted.
Dworkin then argues: “Interpretation is holistic: just as a moral philosopher
might aim at an equilibrium holding together concrete moral intuitions and
abstract justifying principles, adjusting each of these as necessary to achieve
that equilibrium, so an interpreter seeks, though usually unawares [sic], an
equilibrium between background values and concrete interpretive insights.”29
This holism is directly parallel to the holism that characterized the theory of
law offered in Law’s Empire and reminiscent of the notion of “reflective
equilibrium” deployed by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice.30
After arguing for holism, Dworkin distinguishes between three forms of
interpretation:
•
Collaborative interpretation, which assumes that the object of
interpretation has an author who had a project the interpreter tries to
advance.31
•
Explanatory interpretation, which assumes that “an event has some
particular significance for the audience the interpreter addresses.”32
•
Conceptual interpretation, which assumes “that the interpreter seeks
the meaning of a concept that is created and recreated not by single
authors but by the community whose concept it is.”33
Both law and morality are instances of conceptual interpretation. This leads to
the following conclusion: “We must scrap the old picture that counts law and
morality as two separate systems and then seeks or denies interconnections
between them. We must replace this with a one system picture: law is a part or
aspect of morality.”34 Although this passage comes late in the book, for our
purposes, the point to emphasize is that both law and morality are forms of the
same interpretive enterprise – conceptual interpretation – that creates the
norms that govern humans and their communities.
B.

Is the Unity-of-Interpretation Thesis True?

At this point, we can zero in on the unity-of-interpretation thesis. Is it really
the case that interpretation is unified in the way that Dworkin claims? Does all
interpretation aim at the recovery of “meaning” or “purpose”? Of course, the
way we talk about interpretation does lend some credence to Dworkin’s
assertion. We associate interpretation with the recovery of meaning, and if
“meaning” were a single thing, then it would seem to follow that
“interpretation” too is a single thing. But there is a problem with this idea.
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id. (manuscript at 86).
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 18 (rev. ed. 1999).
DWORKIN, supra note 2 (manuscript at 87).
Id.
Id.
Id. (manuscript at 255).
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The term “meaning” is notoriously ambiguous; it has distinct senses with
different referents. Take the example of a legal text. When we ask the
question, “What does this provision mean?,” we might refer to the linguistic
meaning or semantic content. Call this first sense of meaning the semantic
sense. But the term “meaning” can also be used to refer to implications,
consequences, or applications. Call this second sense of meaning the
implicative sense. We might also use the term meaning to refer to the purpose
or function of a given constitutional provision. Call this third sense of
meaning the teleological sense. These three senses of meaning are
nonequivalent. The semantic content of a text is not the same as its
implications. The implications of a text are not the same as its purposes. The
purposes of a text are not the same as its semantic content.
Nor are these three different senses of meaning (semantic, implicative, and
teleological) actually unified by some underlying feature: they are different in
kind. The semantic meaning of a text is a different kind of thing than is the
purpose of the text. Different purposes might motivate the same semantic
content; the same purpose might be expressed by different semantic contents.
The same points could be made about the relationship of implications to
semantic content and the relationship of purposes to implications. Of course,
there can be relationships between these three kinds of meaning. Linguistic
meanings can be used for purposes, and they can create implications. But the
fact that there are relationships between concepts does not show that they are
unified by some underlying structure.
The same ambiguities that inhere in “meaning” also lurk in the noun
“interpretation,” the verb “to interpret,” and the gerund “interpreting.” We
have already observed the wide variety of human activities to which the word
“interpretation” can be applied. In some cases, the activity that we call
“interpretation” seeks to recover the linguistic content of semantic meaning of
a text. When we try to decipher an ancient script in an extinct language or to
discover the contemporary expression that best captures an obscure passage in
a letter written in an archaic version of English, our objective is meaning in the
semantic sense. In other cases, what we call “interpretation” aims at meaning
in the teleological sense. We ask questions like, “How do you interpret the
significance of the Senator’s change in position?” and the same inquiry could
be formulated, “Why did the Senator make this switch?” And in yet other
cases, the activity for which we use the word “interpretation” seeks to discover
the implications of some event with respect to our concerns and interests. We
ask questions like, “On your interpretation, are the results of the election good
or bad for health care reform?” The object of this question is meaning in the
implicative sense.
Dworkin claims that the unity of interpretation is provided by purpose.35
We need to be very careful when parsing this claim, because there are several

35

See id. (manuscript at 84).

562

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:551

different versions of the move to purpose as vindication for the unity-ofinterpretation thesis.
Consider first the possibility that Dworkin is claiming that all interpretation
aims at the recovery of meaning in the teleological sense. That claim is false.
There are a wide variety of interpretations that do not aim at the recovery of
the purpose or function of the object of interpretation. When we “interpret” a
text or utterance, we sometimes aim at the semantic content of the utterance.
In some cases, the function or purpose of the text may be relevant evidence of
its linguistic meaning or semantic content, but it would be gross error to move
from the premise, “X is evidence of Y,” to the conclusion, “Y is X.”
Moreover, there are a variety of cases in which our interpretation of a text or
utterance does not involve evidence of purpose or function. Such evidence
may be unavailable or simply not required given the plainness of the meaning.
Of course, in such cases it is possible for us to make inferences about what the
likely purpose or function of the text was, but the fact that such moves are
possible does not establish the further claim that the recovery of purpose was
the aim of a particular interpretation.
Or perhaps Dworkin is making the claim that because interpretation is a
purposive activity, the teleological sense of meaning is the primary or basic
sense. But this argument would clearly be fallacious. A very wide range of
human activity is purposive – running, eating, playing, working, and so forth.
But it does not follow from the fact that running is a purposive activity that
running is necessarily a form of interpretation. (And if we came to say that
runners “interpret” the track, we would be using the word “interpretation” in a
new and metaphorical sense.) Assuming that interpretation is always a
purposive activity, a further argument would be required to establish the
conclusion that the purpose of interpretation is always the recovery of purpose.
There is yet another sense in which “interpretation” involves purpose.
Consider once again the variety of activities that are called “interpretation.” A
performance of a symphony can be called “interpretation.” When a scientist
tries to determine the implications of an experiment for the confirmation or
disconfirmation of a theory, we say that he “interprets” the results. When a
translator tries to determine the linguistic meaning in English of a text in
Mandarin, the result is an “interpretation” of the text.
Dworkin is right when he observes that the objects of interpretation in each
of these cases have purposes. The composer of the symphony had purposes,
the architect of the experiment had purposes, and the author of the Mandarin
text had purposes. But it does not follow from this fact that the aim of
interpretation in each case is a recovery of the purpose. The conductor may
deliberately offer an interpretation that ignores the purposes of the composer.
The scientist wants to know whether the data from the experiment confirm the
research hypothesis; his interpretation of the results is surely not aimed at
discovering the purpose of the experiment, which he already knew before he
looked at the data. The translator may find knowledge of the purpose for
which the Mandarin text was composed to be useful in determining its
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linguistic meaning, but the translation aims at the semantic content of the text
and not at the purpose for which that semantic content was generated. In each
of these cases, the object of interpretation is of a different kind.
More damning is the fact that interpretation can have nonpurposive objects.
For example, we can interpret the barometer even though barometric pressure
is a natural phenomenon that lacks teleological meaning. But according to
Dworkin, scientific interpretation of data is not “interpretation” at all.36
Nevertheless, “interpretation” of data bears as much family resemblance to the
activity of discovering semantic content as do other activities for which we use
the word “interpretation.”
In sum, the unity-of-interpretation thesis cannot be vindicated by the move
to purpose. It is true that “interpretation” is an intentional human activity, but
this does not differentiate interpretation from other human activities (for
example, running, eating, and hammering) that have purposes. It is true that
most of the objects of interpretation are purposive human activities, and that
these purposes may provide evidence that is relevant to the meaning of the
activity in the semantic, teleological, or implicative senses of “meaning.” But
the fact that purpose is evidence relevant to the various objects of
interpretation does not show that these objects are purposes. We sometimes
use the term “interpretation” to describe the activity of attempting to discern a
purpose, but the word “interpretation” has other senses where the aim of
interpretation is something else.
In oral remarks at the conference where an earlier version of this Essay was
presented, Dworkin suggested that the unity of interpretation is provided by his
three-stage theory of interpretation.37 Recall the three stages:
1. We individuate the practice by distinguishing between genres of
interpretation (literary, legal, musical, and so forth).
2. We attribute some package of purposes to the genre identified in step
one.
3. We identify the best realization of that package of purposes on some
particular occasion.38
It is difficult to imagine how Dworkin could think that the three-stage
sequence can provide an argument for the unity of interpretation. Dworkin
introduces one problem of the three-stage sequence in his introduction: “A
particular interpretation succeeds – it achieves the truth about some object’s
meaning – when it best realizes, for that object, the purposes properly assigned
to the interpretive practice properly identified as pertinent. Interpretation can
therefore be understood, analytically to involve three stages.”39
There is an obvious difficulty in this passage. The first sentence identifies
Dworkin’s theory of the success conditions (or “truth conditions”) for
36
37
38
39

Id. (manuscript at 98).
See Dworkin, Response, supra note 5, at 4.
See supra text accompanying note 27.
DWORKIN, supra note 2 (manuscript at 84).
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interpretation. The second sentence then asserts that the meaning of
“interpretation” (how it can be “understood, analytically”) involves a recipe for
the satisfaction of these success conditions. The second sentence does not
follow from the first. An action token, A1, can be a member of type, Tp, even
if A1 does not follow the recipe, Rx, required for reliable success for Tp. I can
engage in fly-fishing, even if I do not follow the recipe for successful casting.
Likewise, I can engage in interpretation even if I do not try to produce the
interpretation that realizes the package of purposes for the genre of interpretive
object on some particular occasions. If viewed as an account of the unity-ofinterpretation thesis, the passage in Justice for Hedgehogs that we have been
discussing states an invalid argument. The conclusion does not and could not
follow from the premises.
Of course, the validity problem with Dworkin’s argument for the unity-ofinterpretation thesis does not entail that the thesis is false. It is possible that
Dworkin could provide other arguments, but there are good reasons to doubt
this. First and foremost of these is what we might call, following Dworkin, a
problem of fit. The diverse phenomena that Dworkin seeks to unify as
“interpretation” simply do not uniformly display the structure identified by the
three-stage sequence. That is, the three-stage sequence does not identify an
essential or necessary feature of all actions that Dworkin calls interpretation.
Dworkin must recognize this point, because it is implicit in his own
formulation of the argument that there can be interpretations that do not
succeed or are false. Thus, Dworkin’s position may be internally inconsistent.
But internal inconsistency need not be a fatal flaw. Presumably, Dworkin
could fix the statement of his position to eliminate the inconsistency. The
deeper problem with the idea that the three-stage sequence provides the
essential structure of interpretation is that there is overwhelming evidence to
the contrary. Conductors interpret symphonies even when they do not aim to
realize the purposes of the genre – it is still an interpretation even if it aims to
undermine those purposes. Consider the issue of “period performance” in
classical music. A conductor might offer an interpretation of Beethoven’s
Ninth Symphony in order to best realize the purpose of the genre, “symphony”.
But this need not be the case. One can imagine a conductor who says:
Musical beauty is the purpose of symphonic music. And I believe that
the most beautiful interpretations of the Ninth were those of Furtwängler,
who ignored the conventions of performance from Beethoven’s time. But
my interpretation aims at something else. I think it is interesting to hear
the symphony as Beethoven would have heard it (had his hearing not
been impaired), even if this interpretation is not the “best realization” of
the purposes of the symphonic music as a genre.
If Dworkin were right, our conductor’s statement would be simply nonsensical
– an oxymoron. But that is clearly wrong. There is no necessary connection
(conceptual, functional, or metaphysical) between the interpretive character of
an action and its fulfillment of Dworkin’s three-step account.

2010]

THE UNITY OF INTERPRETATION

565

Suppose then that Dworkin were to fix up his argument by conceding that
the three-step sequence does not describe the necessary conditions for an
action to count as interpretation. He might argue instead that the three-stage
sequence allows us to sort the universe of interpretations into the true and the
false (or the successful and the unsuccessful). The argument would then go
something like the following: “An action is an interpretation if and only if it is
the kind of action that would be successful or true if and only if the three-stage
sequence were applied.”
Dworkin has not, so far as I can tell, made such an argument, but were he to
do so, it would face severe difficulties. The three-stage sequence asks us to
identify the type of which the activity is a token, to identify the purpose of that
activity type, and then to conduct the activity so that its purpose is realized. At
first blush, this might sound tautological; an action is successful if and only if
it accomplishes its purpose. If that were all there was to the three-stage
sequence, then every human action would satisfy the criterion for
interpretation. But that hardly will do as a theory that differentiates
interpretation from other human activities. If Dworkin’s claim is that all
human action is interpretation, then he ought to be clear that he is using the
word “interpretation” in a novel (and very unusual) sense. Everyone is entitled
to coin new technical senses for the words used in a natural language, but that
is not the same as offering an account of the activity interpretation that
corresponds to our word “interpretation.”
Dworkin might argue that the tautological gloss on his formulation of the
three-stage sequence is inaccurate. For example, he might claim that the
formula is limited to “social practices” and that the idea of a practice provides
the necessary content to differentiate interpretation from other human
activities. So Dworkin might formulate his theory of interpretation as follows:
“An action is an interpretation if and only if (1) the object of the action is a
social practice; and (2) the success conditions of the action token are given by
the purpose of the social practice which is the object of action.” We are now in
deep waters far from the shore provided by the actual text of Justice for
Hedgehogs. And it is not clear that his move will enable Dworkin to vindicate
the unity-of-interpretation thesis. What does it mean for the object of an action
to be a social practice? The object of a particular action token, running, may
be a social practice, competing in a race, but that does not make running into a
genre of interpretation.
We could continue with our effort to fix up Dworkin’s argument for the
unity-of-interpretation thesis, but at this stage we have done enough work to
identify a pattern in the dialectic of argument. Dworkin has attempted to make
“interpretation” into something that is “interpretive all the way down.”40 This
means that his question – “What is the object of interpretation?” – is itself an
interpretive question.
Once Dworkin becomes committed to making
interpretation “interpretive all the way down,” he must give a theory of
40

Id.
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interpretation that does not include an account of the particular kind of thing
(or type of “meaning”) at which interpretation aims. I will call this the
avoidance strategy. Dworkin avoids an account of the kind of meaning (or
other object) at which interpretation aims.
Dworkin’s avoidance strategy is required for him to make out the unity-ofinterpretation thesis. If he were to specify the object (target, aim, or goal) of
interpretation then he would be forced to acknowledge that “interpretation” is
being used in different senses in cases where the aim is to discover different
objects (for example, linguistic meaning, purposes, implications, or something
else). Dworkin cannot give up on the unity-of-interpretation thesis if he wants
to make out his larger claim – that there are only two forms of human
intellectual activity, science and interpretation (“the two-forms claim”). And
Dworkin cannot give up on two-forms claim, because it is the basis of his
ultimate conclusion that law is part of morality, because both law and morality
are interpretive.
The avoidance strategy is a consequence of Dworkin’s attempt to make the
category of interpretation so broad as to encompass all human intellectual
activity outside of science. But once the category becomes this broad in scope,
it becomes disconnected from the word “interpretation” as it used in ordinary
language. Dworkin began with a theory of interpretation in hard cases (in
Hard Cases), expanded that theory into a general account of legal decisionmaking (in Law’s Empire), and then broadened that theory into a general
account of all human intellectual activity other than science (in Justice for
Hedgehogs). Once we have this pattern clearly in view, it should come as no
surprise that something has been lost in translation. A theory of the
interpretation of legal texts is not a good candidate for a theory of all legal
decision-making. A theory of legal decision-making is not a good candidate
for a theory of all nonscientific human intellectual activity. When Dworkin
started, he was discussing a category that could meaningfully be understood as
“interpretation”; when he finished, he was not.
We are now back to the question posed at the beginning of the Essay.
Recall that we identified three possible views of the relationships among the
various activities that we call interpretation: (1) the ambiguity thesis, (2) the
family resemblance thesis, and (3) the unity-of-interpretation thesis. We have
established that the unity-of-interpretation thesis is false, and this leaves two
possibilities. It might be the case that interpretation is a family resemblance
concept – the close association among the various senses of interpretation and
the related idea of meaning suggest that this might be the case. Or it is
possible that the ambiguity thesis is correct, and at least some things we call
“interpretation” are wholly different in kind from others. But the claim that all
the various human activities we call “interpretation” are marked out by an
essential structure is false.
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III. THE PATH NOT TAKEN: THE INTERPRETATION-CONSTRUCTION
DISTINCTION
Justice for Hedgehogs is a hugely ambitious book, a cathedral of argument.
Although Dworkin’s theory of interpretation appears to be a central part of the
architecture – the dome itself and not a merely decorative gargoyle – it is
possible that the central structure might survive a radical revision of his
account of interpretation. We might be able to reconstruct the dome and leave
the flying buttresses, arches, and walls intact. In this Part of the Essay, I will
investigate an alternative universe of argument – the possible world in which
Dworkin pursued an entirely different strategy in responding to the problem of
hard cases.
A.

Alternative Dworkin

Suppose that Dworkin had embraced, rather than rejected, the theoretical
significance of the distinction between “hard cases” and “easy cases” and the
corresponding notion of a “core” and “penumbra.” This alternative Dworkin
would not have said, “Hercules does not need one method for hard cases and
another for easy ones.”41 He would never have abandoned to the two-stage
view (first “fit,” then “justification”). Alternative Dworkin might have
avoided the difficulties with law as integrity that drove actual Dworkin to the
implausible theory of interpretation that he advances in Justice for Hedgehogs.
Alternative Dworkin would have needed a much different theory of
interpretation – one that distinguishes the type of activity that does the work in
easy cases from the activity that is required in hard cases. There are hints in
Dworkin’s later work, including Justice for Hedgehogs, that he continues to
recognize the basis for such a distinction. In the context of statutory
interpretation, he writes:
[Lawyers] must decide, for example, what division of political authority
among different branches of government and civil society is best all
things considered. That question in turn forces upon American lawyers,
at least, further and more general questions of democratic theory; they
must assume or decide, for instance, drawing on theory or instinct, how
far unelected judges should assume an authority to decide for themselves
which of the semantically available interpretations of a controversial
statute would produce the best law.42
I have added emphasis to the phrase “semantically available interpretations”
because it suggests that Dworkin may still be committed to a two-step picture
or a two-methods view. But I do not want to over-interpret such scanty
evidence, as the phrase does not appear again in Justice for Hedgehogs. The
phrase is absent from any article by Dworkin in the Westlaw database of law

41
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DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 354.
DWORKIN, supra note 2 (manuscript at 85) (emphasis added).
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journals,43 and a Google search for the phrase yields only a single paper, which
is itself a precursor of Justice for Hedgehogs.44 But the suggestion is clear:
some interpretations of a legal text are “semantically available” and some are
not. This suggests that Hercules must choose from among the semantically
available interpretations, requiring Hercules to engage in the enterprise of
determining “semantic availability.”
Imagine then the possible world in which alternative Dworkin offered a
theory of semantic availability and then developed a theory of interpretation
that incorporated that theory. How might that go?
B.

The Interpretation-Construction Distinction

Alternative Dworkin might have noticed an old distinction, familiar to the
common lawyer, between “interpretation” and “construction.”45 The commonlaw distinction was and is a technical one – in ordinary parlance, the two words
are frequently used interchangeably, but they are also used to mark a difference
between two distinct activities. Let us stipulate46 the following definitions for
the purposes of the interpretation-construction distinction:
•
“Interpretation” shall refer to the process (or activity) that recognizes
or discovers the “linguistic meaning” or “semantic content” of the
legal text.
•
“Construction” shall refer to the process (or activity) that translates
linguistic meaning into legal effects (or “semantic content” into “legal

43

I searched the Journals and Law Reviews database, using search term “semantically
available.”
44 Ronald Dworkin, Interpretation, Morality, and Truth (Fall 2002) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www1.law.nyu.edu/clppt/program2002/readings/dworkin/
dworkin.rtf. I performed this Google search on January 24, 2010.
45 See E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 939
(1967). Although this article by Farnsworth is the first theoretically sophisticated discussion
in a contemporary law review, the distinction goes back at least as far as the nineteenth
century. See ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 534 (1952); FRANCIS
LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 43-44 (3d ed. 1880); 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON &
WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 602 (3d ed. 1961); Arthur
L. Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 740-41 (1919); Edwin W.
Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 833
(1964).
46 To be absolutely clear, the words “interpretation” and “construction” are not always
used this way. There is a long history of this usage in American common-law jurisprudence
that embraces this distinction, but the distinction between interpretation and construction is
a technical, legal and theoretical distinction. The senses that are stipulated in the definitions
specified above are technical senses. In other contexts, these words are used as synonyms
that refer to whole activity (both the discovery of linguistic meaning and the construction of
legal doctrines). And both words have other senses as well – already identified for
“interpretation,” and obvious in the case of “construction” (that is, “construction” has a
sense that refers to building).
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content”), typically through the development of legal doctrines that
resolve particular cases or guide official behavior.
Recall the two-step picture in Hard Cases and the Dworkinian concept of
semantic availability.
We can now see that the first step involves
interpretation; after Hercules identifies the set of authoritative legal texts, he
then ascertains their linguistic meaning or semantic content. The linguistic
meaning of the texts in turn determines what Dworkin calls “semantic
availability.”47 The second step involves construction – determination of the
content of legal doctrine from among the range of possibilities that are
semantically available. In easy cases, the range of semantically available
alternatives is narrow. Once we have discovered the linguistic meaning of the
relevant legal texts, the relevant content of legal doctrine is clear, and
construction (the translation of semantic content into legal content) is easy. In
hard cases, the range of semantically available alternatives underdetermines
the set of possible legal doctrines, and determination of the legal effect of the
text requires construction that goes beyond easy translation of semantic content
into legal content. This additional work at the stage of construction is what
makes these cases “hard.” Hard cases are located in what I call “the
construction zone,”48 the arena in which the underdetermination of legal
content by semantic content highlights the work done by construction.
We can make this sketchy reconstruction of the two-step picture of Hard
Cases more detailed and concrete by saying more about the ways in which
alternative Dworkin might theorize each of these two activities.
C.

Interpretation: An Account of Semantic Availability

In Hard Cases, Dworkin seemed committed to a distinction between hard
cases and easy cases that corresponded in a rough and ready way with H.L.A.
Hart’s idea of the core and penumbra.49 How does interpretation (which yields
semantic content or linguistic meaning) sometimes result in easy cases and
sometimes produce hard cases?
What do we do when we interpret a legal text? This is a complicated
question and a full answer would take us into the deepest waters of the
philosophy of language. If we stay close to the surface, a familiar picture
emerges. When we communicate via language (written or oral), we use words
and phrases that can be formed into complex expressions using the rules of
syntax and grammar. Sometimes the smallest meaningful unit of expression is
a single word; sometimes, whole phrases carry meanings that cannot be
decomposed into the meaning of constituent words. When we parse a legal
text, we aim to recover the meaning of the relevant words and phrases and to

47

See supra text accompanying note 42.
See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction 14 (Mar. 4, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Boston University Law Review).
49 See supra Part I.A.
48
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discern the way in which they are combined into larger units of meaning – for
example, sentences, clauses, sections, rules, and statutes.
In the standard case, the reader of a legal text can rely on an intuitive
knowledge of the natural language that she speaks. The act of interpretation is
invisible, because it does not require our conscious attention. But in many
cases, the parsing of a legal text requires effort – the meaning is not intuitively
obvious. In such cases, the act of interpretation becomes visible – we notice an
initial failure of comprehension and work to interpret the text. There can be a
variety of reasons for the initial failure of understanding. Complex statutes and
rules may require multiple readings in order to reveal the underlying structure
– patterns of conjunction, disjunction, and exception – that provide the
algorithm contained in the text.
In addition to complexity, there are at least two other sources of uncertainty
connected with the linguistic meaning or semantic content of a legal text –
vagueness and ambiguity. In ordinary speech, the distinction between
vagueness and ambiguity is not always observed. The two terms are
sometimes used interchangeably, and when this is the case, they both mark a
general lack of what we might call “determinacy” (or “clarity” or “certainty”)
of meaning. But the terms “vague” and “ambiguous” also have technical (or
more precise) senses, such that there is a real difference in their meaning.50
In this technical sense, ambiguity refers to the multiplicity of meanings; a
term is ambiguous if it has more than one sense.51 A classic example is the
word “cool.” In one sense “cool” means “low temperature,” as in, “The room
was so cool we could see our breath.” In another sense, “cool” means
something like “hip” or “stylish,” as in, “Miles Davis was so cool that every
young trumpet player imitated him.” And cool has several other senses,
referring to temperament, certain colors, and a lack of enthusiasm (or the
presence of skepticism or mild hostility).
The technical sense of vagueness refers to the existence of borderline cases;
a term is vague if there are cases where the term might or might not apply.52 A
classic example is the word “tall.” In one sense, “tall” refers to height (of a
person or other entity) that is higher than average. Abraham Lincoln, who
stood at almost 6’4”, was certainly tall for his time. Napoleon was not tall,
50 See Legal Theory Lexicon, Legal Theory Lexicon 051: Vagueness and Ambiguity,
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2006/08/legal_theory_le.html (last visited
Feb. 6, 2010).
51 Farnsworth, supra note 45, at 953; Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and
Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30
GA. L. REV. 171, 173 (1995); John T. Valauri, Confused Notions and Constitutional Theory,
12 N. KY. L. REV. 567, 570-71 (1985).
52 A deeper account is offered in TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW (2000).
Endicott identifies two marks of vagueness: (1) borderline cases; and (2) a tolerance
principle, which states that “a tiny change in an object in a respect relevant to the
application of the expression cannot make the difference between the expression’s applying
and not applying.” Id. at 33.
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although at 5’6” he was of average height for his time. There are persons who
are clearly tall and clearly not tall, but there are also borderline cases. For
example, in the United States in the twenty-first century, males who are 5’11”
may be neither clearly tall nor clearly not.
Finally, a given word or phrase can be both vague and ambiguous. “Cool”
is ambiguous, and in the temperature sense, it is also vague. For example, in
the upper Midwestern United States, sixty-five degrees Fahrenheit is neither
clearly cool nor clearly not cool.
Interpretation relates to ambiguity and vagueness in different ways. When a
text is ambiguous, the aim of interpretation is to determine which of the
alternative senses is the intended or public meaning.53 Characteristically, the
context of utterance (the situation in which the text was written) enables a
reader or listener to determine the semantic content of an ambiguous text. The
word “cool” is acontextually ambiguous, but in the utterance, “This room is
really cool, I’d better put on my sweater,” the evidence points to the
temperature-related sense of “cool.”
In some cases, however, interpretation cannot resolve an ambiguity. There
are two conceptually distinct reasons for persistent ambiguity. The first reason
is epistemological. We may lack sufficient evidence of context to permit
disambiguation. For example, if you find a slip of paper on the ground with
only the word “cool,” and you have no other relevant information, you simply
do not have sufficient information about context to permit you to determine the
relevant sense.
The second reason for persistent ambiguity is ontological. Some utterances
are irreducibly ambiguous. These irreducible ambiguities would remain even
if we had complete information about contexts of utterance. Irreducible
ambiguity can be created intentionally. For example, the drafters of a legal
provision might have good reasons to bring the drafting process to an end even
though they are unable to agree on semantic content. One way this can be
accomplished is via deliberate ambiguity: draft language that can be read in
two different ways, corresponding to the two distinct semantic contents
favored by the two subsets of the drafters.
Interpretation relates to vagueness in an entirely different way. When a text
is vague, the linguistic meaning or semantic content of the text is vague. When
a legal text employs a word or phrase that is vague, the semantic context of the
text creates a set of borderline cases that are neither clearly within nor clearly
outside of the linguistic meaning. This is at least part of what Hart attempted
to capture with his notion of the core and penumbra. Hart’s penumbra is (at
least in part) simply a metaphor for the borderline cases that are created by the
semantic content of vague texts. Interpretation sometimes resolves ambiguity,
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By “intended or public meaning,” I mean to elide the question whether the meaning of
a legal text is a function of the author’s intentions or the conventional semantic meanings of
the words and phrases and the patterns of usage that constitute the rules of grammar and
syntax for a given linguistic community.
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but interpretation yields vagueness. Once we determine that the linguistic
meaning of a text is vague, interpretation has done its work.
D.

Construction: Alternative Dworkinian Accounts

Interpretation exits the stage once we have determined the semantic content
of a legal text. That is, interpretation determines the range of legal content that
is semantically available – the construction zone. Provisionally, we might
assume that alternative Dworkin would distinguish between (1) cases in which
the construction zone is tightly constrained by the semantic content of
authoritative legal texts, easy cases; and (2) cases in which the construction
zone is (in relation to the case at hand) capacious, creating a range of
semantically available legal content that will produce legal outcomes that have
different practical implications for the interested parties, hard cases.
On this provisional assumption,54 Hercules would need two different
methods for resolving easy cases and hard cases. As for “easy cases,” not all
of them will be easy in the sense that they require very little effort. It might
require hard work to clarify ambiguous language or to parse the intricate
structure of a complex statute. What is easy about easy cases is the process of
construction. In an easy case, the semantic content of the text can be directly
translated into the legal content or doctrine that determines the legal effect of
the text. In these cases, interpretation does the work (whether difficult or not)
and the required construction of legal doctrine follows directly.
In hard cases, on the other hand, interpretation does only some of the work.
When interpretation yields semantic content that is vague or irreducibly
ambiguous, Hercules will require a theory of construction that will enable him
to choose among the irreducibly ambiguous senses of the text or to draw a line
in order to resolve borderline cases. What theory of construction might
alternative Dworkin have produced?
This question is not the same question as, “What theory of construction
would actual Dworkin provide for alternative Dworkin?” Actual Dworkin has
already gone through the psychological processes that led him from Hard
Cases to Law’s Empire to Justice for Hedgehogs. In the possible worlds talk,
we might say that actual Dworkin is psychologically distant from alternative
Dworkin – or more precisely that the actual world is distant in that way from
the possible world of alternative Dworkin.
We can imagine that alternative Dworkin might have developed a theory of
construction that shares a variety of features with the theory of interpretation
produced by actual Dworkin. Consider the model of fit and justification from
Hard Cases.55 Alternative Dworkin might develop a theory of construction
54

In this Essay, I will not investigate the possibility that a Dworkinian theory of
construction might authorize legal content that is inconsistent with semantic content. This is
an important question, but its resolution is not required for the purposes of investigating the
main implications of the interpretation-construction distinction for Dworkin’s view.
55 See supra Part I.A.
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that adapts this model to the interpretation-construction distinction.
Alternative Dworkin might say that the model of fit and justification does not
properly apply to interpretation at all. Interpretation is the activity that
produces the semantic content from which Hercules develops the theory of
construction that best fits and justifies the semantic content of the authoritative
legal texts as a whole.56
From there, alternative Dworkin might proceed in a number of different
directions. Or to put it differently, we can imagine a branching tree of possible
worlds in which different alternative Dworkins develop various theories of
construction. One alternative Dworkin might emphasize the idea of coherence.
His alternative Hercules might develop a theory of construction that takes
seriously the idea that “the law is a seamless web.” That version of the theory
would emphasize the idea of consistency and mutual normative support among
legal rules, with the semantic content produced by interpretation providing the
starting points from which doctrine is constructed. The first alternative
Dworkin would have “taken rights seriously,” because his theory of
construction is based on the idea that there is (in principle) a legally correct
answer to every legal question – the answer that best coheres with the legal
materials as a whole.
Another alternative Dworkin might emphasize the role of morality and
political philosophy in construction. This second alternative Dworkin might
have argued that the choice between legal doctrines is underdetermined by
interpretation, and that Hercules should adopt the construction that is supported
by the first-best moral and political theory, even if that theory would count
rules required by the linguistic meaning of many cases, rules, statutes, and
constitutional provisions as mistakes. The second alternative Dworkin also
takes rights seriously, but the work is done by moral rather than legal
considerations.
Both the first and second alternative Dworkins share a picture of the
relationship between law and morality that actual Dworkin rejects in Justice
for Hedgehogs. Here is his statement of that picture:
Here is the orthodox picture. “Law” and “morals” describe different
collections of norms. The differences are deep and important. Law
belongs to a particular community. Morality does not: it consists of a set
of standards or norms that have imperative force for everyone. Law is, at
least for the most part, made by human beings, through contingent
decisions and practices of different sorts. It is a contingent fact that the
law in England requires people to compensate others whom they injure by
their negligent acts. Morality is not made by anyone (except, on some
56 For the purposes of this simplified version of alternative Dworkin’s theory, I am
eliding a number of complexities. For example, the object of “fit” might be broader than the
semantic content of the authoritative legal texts; it might include the actions and practices of
legal actors and institutions. These complications are simply set aside for the purposes of
this Essay.
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views, God) and it is not contingent on any human decision or practice. It
is a necessary not contingent fact that people who injure others
negligently have a moral obligation to compensate them if they can.57
As we have already noted, the actual Dworkin rejects the orthodox picture, but
he clearly states that this rejection is a late development – coming after early
statements of his views in essays like Hard Cases:
Forgive a paragraph of autobiography. When, more than forty years ago,
I first tried to defend interpretivism, I defended it within this orthodox
two-systems picture. I assumed that law and morals are different systems
of norms and that the crucial question is how they interact. So I said what
I have just said: that the law includes not just enacted rules, or rules with
pedigree, but justifying principles as well. I very soon came to think,
however, that the two-systems picture of the problem was itself flawed,
and I began to approach the issue through a very different picture. I did
not appreciate the nature of that picture, however, or how different it was
from the orthodox model, until much later when I began to consider the
larger issues of this book.58
Can we imagine a third version of alternative Dworkin, one who accepts the
interpretation-construction distinction but rejects the two-systems view? That
is a very large question, and anything like a thorough answer would require an
essay or monograph of its own. Nonetheless, we can reflect on the question
and consider some tentative thoughts.
The third alternative Dworkin must embrace a distinction between
interpretation and construction – between the activity of determining linguistic
meaning and the activity of constructing the content of legal doctrines. Can
someone who rejects the two-systems view of law and morality accept this
distinction? The actual Dworkin of Justice for Hedgehogs provides reasons to
think that the interpretation-construction distinction can be reconciled with the
one-system view of law and morality. Recall that Dworkin’s position in
Justice for Hedgehogs accepts a distinction between science and interpretation.
Dworkin accepts that there are “brute fact[s]” about the world that are not the
product of “interpretation” in the broad sense that Dworkin uses that word.59
Investigations into the linguistic meaning of utterances are “scientific” in the
broad sense of that term. Linguistics and the philosophy of language provide
the theoretical structure of the science of interpretation (remembering that we
are using the word “interpretation” in the technical sense specified by the
interpretation-construction distinction). The truth or falsity of particular
interpretations is a function of the correct theory of linguistic meaning,
linguistic facts about patterns of usage that establish conventional semantic
meanings and regularities of syntax and grammar, and the particular facts that
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DWORKIN, supra note 2 (manuscript at 252).
Id. (manuscript at 253).
Id. (manuscript at 17, 97-100).
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provide the content and context of a particular utterance or writing. The fact
that interpretation is “scientific” in this sense does not imply that we can be
certain about the meaning of particular utterances, nor does it imply that
particular interpretations are not causally influenced by the values, purposes, or
ideologies of the human beings who do the interpreting. The claim is simply
that interpretations (or assertions about interpretations) are truth-apt (they can
be true or false), and that their truth or falsity (as opposed to their acceptance
or effect) is determined by facts about the world.
The third alternative Dworkin could simultaneously embrace the
interpretation-construction distinction and reject the two-system view of law
and morality. There is nothing in the one-system view (law is part of morality)
that requires either law or morality to reject the relevance of scientific truth or
facts about the world as inputs into legal deliberation. The interpretationconstruction distinction would require Hercules to consider linguistic facts
when reaching legal conclusions. And every plausible moral theory requires
moral actors to consider facts about the world when they decide how to act on
particular occasions.
What the third alternative Dworkin could not do is affirm “interpretivism” in
the sense that term would have given the interpretation-construction
distinction. That is, the third alternative Dworkin would reject the idea that
discerning linguistic meaning is the activity that unifies law and morality – a
silly view if ever there was one. The third alternative Dworkin would not be
an interpretivist. Where else might the third alternative Dworkin turn? The
relevant continuity would be between legal construction and morality. We
might imagine that the third alternative Dworkin would call the method that
underwrites this continuity “constructivism.”
Once again, explication of the details of Dworkinian constructivism is
beyond the scope of this Essay. But we can begin to imagine how that
explication might go. Consider the following passage, where Dworkin
adumbrates the way that “interpretivism” works on moral concepts:
[I]nterpretive concepts . . . are concepts we share not in virtue of sharing
criteria for their application but rather by accepting that the correct
application depends on the best justification of the various social practices
in which the concept figures. We explicate an interpretive concept
through such a justification: we try to construct an interpretation of the
concept that displays the value we take it to have and we disagree about
the best interpretation because we disagree about that value. Conceptual
analysis of an interpretive concept is therefore itself an exercise in moral
theory. The concept of a moral principle or ideal is an interpretive
concept.60
This passage is infused with the language of interpretation, but it could easily
be rewritten. Here is what the third alternative Dworkin might have said:

60

Id. (manuscript at 67-68).
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Constructive concepts are concepts we share not in virtue of sharing
criteria for their application but rather by accepting that the correct
application depends on the best justification of the various social practices
in which the concept figures. We explicate a constructive concept
through such a justification: we try to construct a version of the concept
that displays the value we take it to have and we disagree about the best
construction because we disagree about that value. Conceptual analysis
of a constructive concept is therefore itself an exercise in moral theory.
The concept of a moral principle or ideal is a constructive concept.
I will later refer to this paraphrase of Dworkin as the “constructive concepts
view.” Of course, much more would need to be said about the constructivism
of the third alternative Dworkin. The third alternative Dworkin might borrow
actual Dworkin’s idea that justification, reason, and argument do the work of
construction. That Dworkin might invoke the idea of “constructions of reason”
or perhaps he would emphasize the notion that construction is a shared (or
social) reason-giving practice.
Further questions arise. Most obviously, what would be the relationship
between the constructivism of the third alternative Dworkin and the views in
contemporary metaethics that we call “constructivism”?61 Onora O’Neill notes
two features of constructivism as a general view in metaethics:
•
“Ethical constructivists . . . doubt or deny that there are distinctively
moral facts or properties, whether natural or nonnatural, which can be
discovered or intuited and will provide foundations for ethics.”62
•
“Constructivisms are distinctive among antirealist ethical positions,
not only in claiming that ethical principles or claims may be seen as
the constructions of human agents but in two further respects. They
also claim that constructive ethical reasoning can be practical – it can
establish practical prescriptions or recommendations which can be
used to guide action – and that it can justify those prescriptions or
recommendations: objectivity in ethics is not illusory.”63
Could the third alternative Dworkin take the distinctive commitments of
constructivism on board, while affirming the core of the view of morality that
Dworkin embraces in Justice for Hedgehogs? Hints are contained in the
following ideas from Justice for Hedgehogs:
•
“[I]t is hard to imagine any distinct state of the world – any
configuration of fundamental moral particles or morons, for instance –

61 There is only one reference to “constructivism” in Justice for Hedgehogs, see
DWORKIN, supra note 2 (manuscript at 171), and in oral remarks at the conference, Dworkin
disavowed understanding of “constructivism” as a theory. See Dworkin, Response, supra
note 5, at 2. On constructivism, see generally Onora O’Neill, Constructivism in Rawls and
Kant, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 347 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003).
62 O’Neill, supra note 61, at 348.
63 Id.
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that can actually makes [sic] your moral opinion true the way physical
particles can make a physical opinion true.”64
•
“Since value judgments cannot be barely true, they can be true only in
virtue of a case. The judgment that the law does not permit a
particular defense, or that invading Iraq was immoral, can be true only
if there is a sound case in law or morals that supports it.”65
Dworkin rejects the relevance of the label “moral realism,”66 but his discussion
of morons suggests the he agrees with the substance of constructivism on this
point. He agrees with the constructivists on both the objectivity and
practicality of morality.
This leaves one final question for the third alternative Dworkin: Can he
embrace the constructivist idea that morality is a construction of human agents
and still embrace the substance of actual Dworkin’s views of morality? If the
third alternative Dworkin can embrace the constructive concepts view
(contained in the paraphrase of Dworkin above), then it would seem that the
answer is “yes.” The constructive concepts view is a version of the
constructivist thesis that morality is a construction of human agents.
In sum, the third alternative Dworkin could embrace the interpretationconstruction distinction and reject the unity-of-interpretation thesis, but
continue to affirm much of the substance of Dworkin’s views about law and
morality by turning to constructivism as the method that grounds both legal
construction in particular and morality in general.
CONCLUSION: FROM CONSTRUCTIVE INTERPRETATION TO CONSTRUCTIVISM
I have argued that the unity-of-interpretation thesis is false, but even if this
is so, it does not follow that the substance of Dworkin’s account of normativity
is false. Nor does it follow that Dworkin’s main point about the relationship
between law and morality – that these are not two separate realms – is
incorrect. Dworkin might be right about these claims, even if he is wrong
about the role that a unified account of interpretation plays in the argument for
them. I have suggested that Dworkin might employ a strategy that rejects
interpretivism and embraces constructivism. Whether the actual Dworkin
would embrace this strategy seems doubtful at best. Whether he should is
another question entirely.
Ronald Dworkin’s views about interpretation have been both influential and
provocative. The main argument of this Essay, which denies the unity-ofinterpretation thesis, suggests that Dworkin took a wrong turn at a very early
stage in the development of his general views about law and morality. Justice
for Hedgehogs is the culmination of developments that began at least as early
as Hard Cases and continued in Law’s Empire. One wrong turn led to another
and then another.
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One thing is certain – Ronald Dworkin’s turns, both right and wrong, have
changed the landscape of contemporary legal theory. Justice for Hedgehogs
provides a welcome occasion for celebrating, debating, and reevaluating
Dworkin’s impressive legacy.

